

GEMÜ R480 Victoria

Butterfly valve with bare shaft

EN

SIL Safety Manual



further information
webcode: GW-R480



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1 General information

The safety manual contains information and safety notes which apply to the use of the butterfly valve in safety-related applications.

The safety manual only applies in connection with the respective installation, operating and maintenance instructions.

Designation	Item number
ba_R480_de_gb	88730584

1.1 Definition of terms

Automatic Diagnostics

Tests performed on line internally by the device or, if specified, externally by another device without manual intervention.

Device

A device is something that is part of an element; but, cannot perform an element safety function on its own.

Dynamic Applications

The movement interval of the final element device is less than 200 hours. Movement may be accomplished by a partial opening test, proof testing or a demand on the system.

Element

A collection of devices that perform an element safety function such as a final element consisting of a logic solver interface, actuator and valve.

exida criteria

A conservative approach to arriving at failure rates suitable for use in hardware evaluations utilizing the 2_H Route in IEC 61508-2.

Fault tolerance

Ability of a functional unit to continue to perform a required function in the presence of faults or errors (IEC 61508-4, 3.6.3).

Low demand mode

Mode, where the demand interval for operation made on a safety-related system is greater than twice the proof test interval.

PVST

"Partial Valve Stroke Test" – partial opening test: It is assumed that the partial opening test, when carried out, is automatically carried out at least an order of magnitude more frequently than the proof test. Therefore, the test can be assumed to constitute automatic diagnostics. Because of the automatic diagnostics assumption, the partial opening test also has an impact on the Safe Failure Fraction.

Random Capability

The SIL limit imposed by the Architectural Constraints for each element.

Severe Service

Condition that exists when material through the valve has abrasive particles, as opposed to Clean Service where these particles are absent.

SFF

Safe Failure Fraction, summarizes the fraction of failures which lead to a safe state plus the fraction of failures which will be detected by automatic diagnostic measures and lead to a defined safety action.

SIS

Safety Instrumented System – Implementation of one or more Safety Instrumented Functions. A SIS is composed of any combination of sensor(s), logic solver(s), and final element(s).

Static Applications

The movement interval of the final element device is greater than 200 hours. Movement may be accomplished by a partial opening test, proof testing or a demand on the system.

Type A element

"Non-complex" element (all failure modes are well defined); for details see 7.4.4.1.2 of IEC 61508-2

1.2 Abbreviations

DC

Diagnostic Coverage: Diagnostic coverage of dangerous failures ($DC = \lambda_{dd} / (\lambda_{dd} + \lambda_{du})$)

FIT

Failure in Time: Failure rate (1×10^{-9} failures per hour)

FMEDA

"Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis"

HFT

"Hardware Fault Tolerance"

MTBF

Mean Time Between Failures

MTTR

"Mean Time To Restoration"

PF_{AVG}

"Average Probability of Failure on Demand"

PVST

"Partial Valve Stroke Test": Partial opening test

SFF

"Safe Failure Fraction": Ratio of safe failures to dangerous failures

SIF

"Safety Instrumented Function"

SIL

"Safety Integrity Level"

SSI

"Site Safety Index"

TSO

Tight Shut-Off

T [Proof]

Proof Test Interval

2 Standards / Literature used

The services delivered by the testing organization exida were performed based on the following standards / literature:

IEC 61508-2:2010	Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-Related Systems
Mechanical Component Reliability Handbook, 4th Edition, 2016	exida LLC, Electrical & Mechanical Component Reliability Handbook, Fourth Edition, 2016 (pending publication, not publicly available at the time of this report)
Safety Equipment Reliability Handbook, 4th Edition, 2015	exida LLC, Safety Equipment Reliability Handbook, Fourth Edition, 2015, ISBN 978-1-934977-13-2
Goble, W.M., 2010	Control Systems Safety Evaluation and Reliability, 3rd edition, ISA, ISBN 978-1-934394-80-9. Reference on FMEDA methods
IEC 60654-1:1993-02, second edition	Industrial-process measurement and control equipment – Operating conditions – Part 1: Climatic conditions
O'Brien, C., Stewart, L., & Bredemeyer, L., 2018	Exida LLC., Final Elements in Safety Instrumented Systems IEC 61511 Compliant Systems and IEC 61508 Compliant Products, 2018, ISBN 978-1-934977-18-7
Scaling the Three Barriers, Recorded Web Seminar, June 2013	http://www.exida.com/Webinars/Recordings/SIF-Verification-Scaling-the-Three-Barriers
Meeting Architecture Constraints in SIF Design, Recorded Web Seminar, March 2013	http://www.exida.com/Webinars/Recordings/Meeting-Architecture-Constraints-in-SIF-Design
Random versus Systematic – Issues and Solutions, September 2016	https://www.exida.com/Resources/Whitepapers/random-versus-systematic-failures-issues-and-solutions
Bukowski, J.V. and Chastain-Knight, D., April 2016	Assessing Safety Culture via the Site Safety Index™, Proceedings of the AIChE 12th Global Congress on Process Safety, GCPS2016, TX: Houston
Bukowski, J.V. and Stewart, L.L., April 2016	Quantifying the Impacts of Human Factors on Functional Safety, Proceedings of the 12th Global Congress on Process Safety, AIChE 2016 Spring Meeting, NY: New York
Criteria for the Application of IEC 61508:2010 Route 2H, December 2016	Exida White Paper, Sellersville, PA www.exida.com

Goble, W.M. and Brombacher, A.C., November 1999, Vol. 66, No. 2

Using a Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis (FMEDA) to Measure Diagnostic Coverage in Programmable Electronic Systems, Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 66, No. 2, November 1999.

3 Functional description

GEMÜ R480 Victoria® is a soft seated butterfly valve. It is available in nominal sizes DN 25 to 600 and in various body versions such as Wafer, Lug and U section (flanged).

3.1 Safety function

The safety function of the Butterfly Valve is to open on trip, close on trip, or close with a tight shutoff on trip.

4 Proof tests to detect undetected dangerous failures

In accordance with Section 7.4.5.2 f) of IEC 61508-2, proof tests must be carried out to detect dangerous failures that are not recognized by automatic diagnostic tests. This means that it must be determined how undetected dangerous failures, which were identified during the analysis of the error types, error effects and error diagnosis, can be detected during the compliance test.

The suggested proof test comprises swinging the associated device into the end position.

Step	Action
1	Bypass the fail safe function and take appropriate measures to prevent false tripping.
2	Interrupt or change the air supply/input to the actuator in order to force the actuator/valve assembly into the fail-safe state, and confirm that the safe state has been achieved within the correct time. Note: This tests for any errors that could prevent the positioning valve and the remaining positioning element from functioning.
3	Check the actuator and the housing for leaks, visible damage or impurities.
4	Restore the original air supply/original input to the actuator, and confirm that the normal operating state has been achieved.
5	Remove the bypass and restore normal operation.

For the test to be effective, the movement of the valve must be confirmed. To confirm the effectiveness of the test, both the valve travel and the swinging speed must be monitored and compared with the expected results in order to validate the test.

5 Failure categories description

In order to judge the failure behaviour of the Butterfly Valve, the following definitions for the failure of the device were considered.

Fail-Safe State:

Valve, end position State where the valve is closed.

Valve, Tight Shut-Off State where the valve is closed and sealed with leakage no greater than the defined leak rate. The requirements for Tight Shut-Off must be specified according to the application. If requirements for shut-off allow a flow greater than ANSI class V or ANSI class IV, then values for swinging into the end position may be used.

Valve, open on trip State where the valve is open.

Fail Safe Failure that causes the device to go to the defined fail-safe state without a demand from the process.

Fail Dangerous Failure that does not react to a demand from the process (i.e. being unable to go to the defined fail-safe state).

Valve Failure that prevents the valve from moving to the defined fail-safe state within the normal time span.

Fail Dangerous Undetected Failure that is dangerous and that is not being diagnosed by external automatic diagnostics, such as a partial opening test.

Fail Dangerous Detected Failure that is dangerous but is detected by automatic diagnostics, such as a partial opening test.

No Effect Failure of a component that is part of the fail safe function but that has no effect on the fail safe function.

External Leakage Failure that causes process fluids, gas, hydraulic fluids or operating media to leak outside of the valve or actuator. External Leakage is not considered part of the fail safe function and therefore this failure rate is not included in any of the values. External Leakage failure rates should be checked for secondary safety and environmental issues.

The failure categories listed above expand on the categories listed in IEC 61508 in order to deliver a complete set of data needed for design optimization.

6 Assumptions

- The worst-case assumption of a series system is made. Therefore, only a single component failure will fail the entire Butterfly Valve, and propagation of errors is irrelevant.
- Failure rates are constant for the usage period.
- Any product component that cannot influence the fail safe function (without any reactive effect) is excluded. All components that are part of the fail safe function, including those needed for normal operation, are included in the analysis.
- The stress levels are stated in the exida profile used for the analysis, and are limited by the manufacturer's published classifications.
- Materials are compatible with the environmental and process conditions.
- The device is installed and operated in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.
- Valves are installed such that the controlled medium will flow through the valve in the direction indicated by the flow arrow, located on the valve body.
- In order to claim diagnostic coverage for the partial opening test, it is automatically carried out at a rate at least ten times faster than the Demand frequency.
- The partial opening test of the final element comprises position detection from actuator-mounted position sensors, typical of quarter turn installations.
- The worst-case internal fault detection time is the PVST test interval time.

7 exida profiles

exida profile	1	2	3	4	5	6
Description (electrical)	Installed with housing Air-conditioned	Installed with low voltage Not self-heated	Installed with normal voltage Self-heated	Deep sea	Open sea	Not available
Description (mechanical)	Installed with housing Air-conditioned	Installed with normal voltage	Installed with normal voltage	Deep sea	Open sea	In contact with the process
IEC 60654-1 profile	B2	C3 Can also be used for D1	C3 Can also be used for D1	Not available	C3 Can also be used for D1	Not available
Average ambient temperature	30 °C	25 °C	25 °C	5 °C	25 °C	25 °C
Average internal temperature	60 °C	30 °C	45 °C	5 °C	45 °C	Temperature of operating fluid
Daily temperature fluctuation (maximum to maximum)	5 °C	25 °C	25 °C	0 °C	25 °C	Not available
Seasonal temperature difference (winter average compared to summer average)	5 °C	40 °C	40 °C	2 °C	40 °C	Not available
Exposed to elements or the weather	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Humidity ¹⁾	0–95% Non-condensing	0–100% Condensing	0–100% Condensing	0–100% Condensing	0–100% Condensing	Not available
Impact ²⁾	10 g	15 g	15 g	15 g	15 g	Not available
Vibration ³⁾	2 g	3 g	3 g	3 g	3 g	Not available
Chemical corrosion ⁴⁾	G2	G3	G3	G3	G3	Compatible material
Surge ⁵⁾						
Line to line	0.5 kV	0.5 kV	0.5 kV	0.5 kV	0.5 kV	Not available
Line to earth	1 kV	1 kV	1 kV	1 kV	1 kV	Not available
Susceptibility to EMI ⁶⁾						
80 MHz to 1.4 GHz	10 V/m	10 V/m	10 V/m	10 V/m	10 V/m	Not available
1.4 GHz to 2.0 GHz	3 V/m	3 V/m	3 V/m	3 V/m	3 V/m	Not available
2.0 GHz to 2.7 GHz	1 V/m	1 V/m	1 V/m	1 V/m	1 V/m	Not available
ESD (air) ⁷⁾	6 kV	6 kV	6 kV	6 kV	6 kV	Not available

1) Humidity class IEC 60068-2-3

2) Impact class IEC 60068-2-6

3) Vibration class IEC 60770-1

4) Chemical corrosion class ISA 71.04

5) Surge class IEC 61000-4-5

6) Susceptibility to EMI class IEC 6100-4-3

7) ESD (air) class IEC 61000-4-2

8 Profiles for the Site Safety Index

The SSI is a number from 0 to 4 that indicates the level of site activities and practices that contribute to the safety performance of the Safety Instrumented Functions at the site. It should be observed that the numbers reflect the levels of SIL assignment, and that SSI 4 means that all requirements of the IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 standards are fulfilled at the site and that there is therefore no impairment of safety performance due to activities or practices of the end user, i.e. that the principal inherent safety performance is achieved.

So far, several factors have been determined that affect the SSI. These include the quality of the following tests:

- Commissioning test
- Proof test procedure
- Documentation of the acceptance test
- Error diagnosis and repair procedures
- Procedure for monitoring the usage duration and for replacement of devices
- SIS modification procedure
- Procedure for decommissioning the SIS
- and others

Level	Description
SSI 3	Almost perfect <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Repair work is correctly executed - Tests are carried out correctly and to deadline - The material is generally selected on the basis of the specified environmental limit values and a good analysis of the process chemistry and compatible materials - The electrical power supplies are generally free from overvoltage and are insulated - The pneumatic air supplies and the hydraulic fluids are usually kept clean, etc. - Devices are replaced before the end of their service life, - etc.
SSI 2	Good <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Repair work is generally performed correctly - Tests are carried out correctly and usually to deadline - Most devices are replaced before the expiry of their usage period, - etc.
SSI 1	Medium <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A lot of repair work is correctly executed - Tests are carried out, usually to deadline - Some devices are replaced before the expiry of their usage period, - etc.

Level	Description
SSI 0	Nothing <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Repair work is not always carried out - Tests are not carried out - Devices are only replaced if they are faulty, - etc.

9 SIL failure rate calculation GEMÜ R480 (stationary applications)**SIL failure rate calculation****Functional safety in accordance with IEC 61508 and IEC 61511**

We,

GEMÜ Gebr. Müller Apparatebau GmbH & Co. KG
Fritz-Müller-Straße 6-8
74653 Ingelfingen-Criesbach, Germany

declare that, for the product listed below, the failure rates outlined below were detected in safety-related applications in accordance with IEC 61508 and IEC 61511.

The failure rates were determined by means of an FMEDA (Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis) in accordance with IEC 61508. The assessment was carried out by exida.com (report number: GEMÜ 13/08-046 R003).

Product description: GEMÜ butterfly valve R480 Victoria®
Type of valve: A
Safety function: The safety function of the Butterfly Valve is to open on trip, close on trip, or close with a tight shutoff on trip.
HFT (Hardware Fault Tolerance): 0
MTTR (Mean Time To Restoration): 48 hours

The determined failure rates apply to the operating mode with low demand rate:

	Failure rates Clean Service* (in FIT**)					
	Without external test			With external test		
	Closed position		Open position	Closed position		Open position
	End position	Seals tightly		End position	Seals tightly	
Fail safe function:	901	76	901	901	76	901
External Leakage	436	436	436	436	436	436
SIL (Safety Integrity Level): ¹⁾	2	2	2	2	2	2
λ_{DU} (Dangerous Undetected):	556	1381	381	389	1214	214
λ_{DD} (Dangerous Detected):	0	0	0	167	167	167
λ_{SU} (Safe Undetected):	0	0	174	0	0	2
λ_{SD} (Safe Detected):	0	0	0	0	0	172
PTC (Proof Test Coverage):	45 %	18 %	66 %	22 %	7 %	39 %
MTTF fail safe function (Mean Time To Failure):	205	83	206	205	83	206
MTTF full product (Mean Time To Failure):	60	60	60	60	60	60
MTTFd in a (Mean Time To Failure):	205	83	300	205	83	300

1) This SIL classification only means that the calculated values are within the range for hardware-related architectonic limitations for the corresponding SIL.

The determined failure rates apply to the operating mode with low demand rate:

	Failure rates Severe Service*** (in FIT**)					
	Without external test			With external test		
	Closed position		Open position	Closed position		Open position
	End position	Seals tightly		End position	Seals tightly	
Fail safe function:	1727	76	1727	1727	76	1727
External Leakage	544	544	544	544	544	544
SIL (Safety Integrity Level): ¹⁾	2	2	2	2	2	2
λ_{DU} (Dangerous Undetected):	953	2604	605	677	2328	329
λ_{DD} (Dangerous Detected):	0	0	0	276	276	276
λ_{SU} (Safe Undetected):	0	0	349	0	0	3
λ_{SD} (Safe Detected):	0	0	0	0	0	346
PTC (Proof Test Coverage):	43 %	16 %	68 %	20 %	6 %	42 %
MTTF fail safe function (Mean Time To Failure):	120	44	120	120	44	120
MTTF full product (Mean Time To Failure):	35	35	35	35	35	35
MTTFd in a (Mean Time To Failure):	120	44	189	120	44	189

1) This SIL classification only means that the calculated values are within the range for hardware-related architectonic limitations for the corresponding SIL.

As the External Leak failure rates are a subset of the No Effect failure rates, the total No Effect failure rate is the sum of the listed No Effect and External Leak rates. External leakage failure rates do not directly contribute to the reliability of the device but should be reviewed for secondary safety and environmental issues.

* Clean Service = without abrasive particles

** FIT = Failure In Time (1×10^{-9} failures per hour)

*** Severe Service = with abrasive particles

10 SIL failure rate calculation GEMÜ R480 (dynamic applications)

SIL failure rate calculation

Functional safety in accordance with IEC 61508 and IEC 61511

We,

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Product description: GEMÜ butterfly valve R480 Victoria®
Type of valve: A
Safety function: The safety function of the Butterfly Valve is to open on trip, close on trip, or close with a tight shutoff on trip.
HFT (Hardware Fault Tolerance): 0
MTTR (Mean Time To Restoration): 48 hours

The determined failure rates apply to the operating mode with low demand rate:

	Failure rates Clean Service* (in FIT**)					
	Without external test			With external test		
	Closed position		Open position	Closed position		Open position
	End position	Seals tightly		End position	Seals tightly	
Fail safe function:	915	91	915	915	91	915
External Leakage	457	457	457	457	457	457
SIL (Safety Integrity Level): ¹⁾	2	2	2	2	2	2
λ_{DU} (Dangerous Undetected):	356	1179	181	309	1132	134
λ_{DD} (Dangerous Detected):	0	0	0	47	47	47
λ_{SU} (Safe Undetected):	0	0	175	0	0	2
λ_{SD} (Safe Detected):	0	0	0	0	0	173
PTC (Proof Test Coverage):	20 %	6 %	39 %	8 %	2 %	17 %
MTTF fail safe function (Mean Time To Failure):	321	97	321	321	97	321
MTTF full product (Mean Time To Failure):	66	66	66	66	66	66
MTTFd in a (Mean Time To Failure):	321	97	631	321	97	631

1) This SIL classification only means that the calculated values are within the range for hardware-related architectonic limitations for the corresponding SIL.

The determined failure rates apply to the operating mode with low demand rate:

	Failure rates Severe Service*** (in FIT**)					
	Without external test			With external test		
	Closed position		Open position	Closed position		Open position
	End position	Seals tightly		End position	Seals tightly	
Fail safe function:	1739	91	1739	1739	91	1739
External Leakage	579	579	579	579	579	579
SIL (Safety Integrity Level): ¹⁾	2	2	2	2	2	2
λ_{DU} (Dangerous Undetected):	680	2327	331	601	2248	251
λ_{DD} (Dangerous Detected):	0	0	0	79	79	80
λ_{SU} (Safe Undetected):	0	0	350	0	0	3
λ_{SD} (Safe Detected):	0	0	0	0	0	347
PTC (Proof Test Coverage):	18 %	5 %	36 %	7 %	2 %	16 %
MTTF fail safe function (Mean Time To Failure):	168	49	168	168	49	168
MTTF full product (Mean Time To Failure):	38	38	38	38	38	38
MTTFd in a (Mean Time To Failure):	168	49	345	168	49	345

1) This SIL classification only means that the calculated values are within the range for hardware-related architectonic limitations for the corresponding SIL.

As the External Leak failure rates are a subset of the No Effect failure rates, the total No Effect failure rate is the sum of the listed No Effect and External Leak rates. External leakage failure rates do not directly contribute to the reliability of the device but should be reviewed for secondary safety and environmental issues.

* Clean Service = without abrasive particles

** FIT = Failure In Time (1×10^{-9} failures per hour)

*** Severe Service = with abrasive particles

